The returns to many types of investments in human or …nancial capital appear to be very high, yet investment levels remain quite low in many developing countries. For example, it has been estimated that 63% of under 5 mortality could be averted if households invested in lumpy preventative health products. Why don't people make these investments? While credit constraints are the most obvious culprit, barriers to savings also appear to be an important obstacle to investment, though it remains unclear as to why people cannot save more on their own. In this paper, we shed some light on the pathways through which savings towards lumpy investments can be constrained. We present results of a …eld experiment in Kenya, in which a random subset of individuals was given savings products which di¤ered in the amount of commitment and liquidity that they provided. We observe their levels of investment in preventative health products, as well as their ability to a¤ord care for health emergencies, a year later. Our main results are that (1) pressure to share money with others (both the spouse and social contacts) is a major constraint to saving in the context studied; (2) self-control problems represent another barrier;
Introduction
A vast literature suggests that the returns to investing in various types of assets are very high in developing countries. For example, recent studies have shown large returns to capital for a variety of businesses across a range of developing countries. Many of these unrealized pro…ts are for investments which do not involve any fundamental change in the production process, such as increasing inventory or buying basic equipment, or to adopting technologies which have been available for a long time, such as fertilizer for maize (Du ‡o et al. 2010 ). Though the return to capital has been the most studied topic in economics, other types of investments also seem to have high returns, including several types of health investments. Among others, these include iron supplementation (Thomas et al., 2006; Bobonis et al. 2006 ), insecticide-treated bednets (Lengeler, 2004) , or chlorine for clean water (Fewtrell et al. 2005 ; Arnold and Colford 2007), among many others.
In fact, it has been estimated that 63% of the death of children under the age of …ve could be averted with simple health products Jones et al., 2003) .
The returns to holding bu¤er saving stocks also appear large. Having insu¢ cient savings to deal with unexpected income shocks often force households to take costly actions to maintain consumption -from pulling children out of school (Jacoby and Skou…as, 1993; Ferreira and Schady, 2008) to selling o¤ productive assets (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993) to liquidating business inventory (Dupas and Robinson, 2011) .
Why can't households realize these large returns? Lack of access to credit is the obvious culprit, and tremendous resources have been put into relieving credit constraints through micro…nance. However, many of the investment opportunities listed above do not require large upfront costs, so that households should be just as able to gradually save up for such investments than to take out loans and then gradually pay them back. Indeed, recent studies in India and Morocco suggest relatively limited demand for loans as they are currently o¤ered by microcredit agencies (Banerjee et al. 2010; .
What then prevents poor households from saving for these technologies? One possible answer is that the poor are simply too poor to save (Bhaduri, 1973) . That is, even if they can save the majority of their transitory income in good times and engage in a substantial degree of intertemporal consumption-smoothing, , as the Thai rice farmers studied by Paxson (1992) , the poor might not make enough money on average to accumulate human or physical capital. While it's true that those just at subsistence will, by de…nition, have no surplus to save, the majority of even the world's poorest people appear to have some slack in their budget, however. For example, Banerjee and Du ‡o (2007) use detailed household surveys to study the consumption patterns of extremely poor households (even by developing country standards) -those who live below the global poverty line of $1 or less per day per person. Even though these households are extremely poor, the majority do not use all of their income to a¤ord basic necessities. Poor households also often report wanting to save more (Rutherford, 2000) . What prevents them from doing so? This paper examines the importance of three types of barriers to savings -interhousehold, intra-household, and intra-personal -and estimates the demand for and impact of simple saving devices designed to relieve these constraints.
Inter-household barriers may arise in the presence of social or moral norms that necessitate that an individual provides support to friends and relatives if she is asked for money and has cash on hand. Such egalitarian norms, which create disincentives to personal savings, have been documented by Platteau (2000) in the West African context. Baland, Guirkinger and Mali (2007) present evidence from Cameroon consistent with a model in which middle-class individuals take on (costly) loans they don't need as a way to signal poverty and avoid requests for …nancial help from friends and relatives. Finally, in a recent experimental study in Western Kenya, Jakiela and Ozier (2011) …nd that women are willing to pay a substantial cost (in the form of either a fee or foregone returns) in order to hide income from their relatives.
Intra-household barriers may arise if members of a household have di¤erent preferences
over what to save for, or if they face di¤erent returns to various potential lumpy investments. In the absence of an individual saving technology, household members who have a higher demand for, say, health, might not be able to ensure that households'savings will be used towards health investments. As a result, they might choose to not contribute to household savings. Anderson and Baland (2002) argue that such intra-household con ‡icts in preferences over durable goods explain why women often participate in local saving circles called ROSCAs (Rotating Saving and Credit Associations). A ROSCA is a group of individuals who come together and make regular cyclical contributions to a fund (called the "pot"), which is then given as lump sum to one member in each cycle. Anderson and Baland (2002) argue that once women have joined a ROSCA, they are socially obligated to continue to attend the meetings and contribute to the pot, and so the ROSCA can act as a device to commit the household to the ROSCA member's savings plan.
Finally, intra-personal barriers may arise if individuals'preferences are not constant over time. In particular, individuals might be "present-biased": they may be more patient in the future than in the present. The presence of such preferences has been well established among the general population in the United States, and commitment devices such as automatic transfers onto 401(k) accounts have been shown critical in increasing saving rates for retirement (Madrian and Shea, 2001) . Similar evidence has started to emerge for less developed countries (Ashraf et al., 2006) , and such preferences appear to be another reason that women participate in ROSCAs (Gugerty, 2007) . Just as a ROSCA can provide commitment against spousal demands for income, so can they serve as a commitment device against time-inconsistent preferences.
To estimate the relative importance of these three types of barriers for the poor in developing countries, we designed a …eld experiment in rural Kenya in which we randomly varied access to innovative saving devices speci…cally designed to alleviate one or more of the barriers discussed above. Though these devices could be relevant for any number of investments, we designed this study around enabling savings for health. Our primary outcomes are (1) investment in preventative health products, and (2) whether households are able to deal with health emergencies when they arise.
As we will discuss below, several of our treatments involved a social component. To implement these, it was necessary to work with existing social structures, and we chose to work with the most common social structure in our area of study: ROSCAs. As ROSCAs would not normally be open to expanding their membership on the request of a research team, we restricted our sample frame to those already participating in ROSCAs. While this sampling strategy means that our sample is not necessarily representative of the entire population (since everybody in the sample will have at least some ability to save to start with), it is likely far from representive since ROSCA participation is,very common in our area of study, as in most of sub-Saharan Africa (Anderson and Baland, 2002) . .
We worked with 113 ROSCAs in one division of Western Kenya, and randomly assigned these ROSCAs to one of …ve treatment groups (one control and four di¤erent experimental treatments). Individuals in all groups were encouraged to save for health and asked to set a health goal for themselves. In addition, in each treatment group, individuals were o¤ered a saving device to help them reach that goal. The features of the saving device o¤ered di¤ered across groups. To measure impacts, we conducted questionnaires with 770 individuals across the 113 ROSCAs.
In the …rst two treatment groups, individual members of the ROSCAs were given a locked metal box (with a deposit slit) in which they could save at home. In one group (the "Safe Box " group), people got the key to the lock, and therefore could take out money from their box whenever they wanted, even to spend on non-health products. In the other group (the "Lock Box "group), people did not receive the key -they had to call the program o¢ cer in order to get the box opened. They were told that the money in the box, once opened by the research team, could only be used to buy a health product.
In the third treatment group, individuals were encouraged to use their existing ROSCA to create a "Health Pot"-in addition to the regular ROSCA pot, people would contribute an additional amount during regular meetings that would fund a side pot earmarked towards the acquisition of a preventative health product. Finally, individuals in the fourth treatment group were encouraged to save in an individual "Health Savings Account"held at the ROSCA and earmarked for emergency health costs.
Given the exogenous variation in the features of the saving devices o¤ered, we can tease out the respective roles of inter-household, intra-personal and intra-household barriers, by comparing health expenditures across groups and across types of individuals. For these comparisons, we group the products into two categories: (1) those that enabled saving for lump-sum preventative health purchases (the Safe Box, Lock Box, and Health Pot), and (2) those that enabled saving for unexpected emergencies (the Safe Box and the Health Savings Account).
To start, the most basic treatment was the "Safe Box " treatment. Individuals who received a box with its key couldn't protect the money from themselves, but could physically protect it from others. Thus, if people saved in the "Safe Box "treatment, it must be the case that, without such a box, people have di¢ culty hiding their money from neighbors, relatives and/or spouses.
We can then compare the e¤ect of the Safe Box to other treatments to identify other e¤ects. We start with the mechanisms used for saving for preventative products (the Lock Box and the Health Pot). First, the Lock Box provided protection from others in exactly the same way as did the Safe Box, but it also provided a much stronger form of commitment which might be useful for solving intra-personal self-control problems. Thus, any additional impact of the Lock Box beyond the Safe Box should be attributable to the earmarking it featured, and the e¤ect of the box should be greatest for those with timeinconsistent preferences. On the other hand, the earmarking might tend to discourage savings, especially for those without self-control problems, since it severely limits liquidity.
The second comparison is between the Lock Box and the Health Pot. While both of these interventions provided earmarking, the incentives to save in Health Pot are stronger than those in the Lock Box. First, tying one's one own hands without any external help might be di¢ cult. People might like the idea of setting aside money for health in a Lock Box, but since there is no binding commitment contract to deposit, they might never deposit any money in it, especially if they are "naïve" in their present-bias. Such individuals might need a stronger form of commitment to force themselves to continue to make deposits. The "Health Pot"o¤ered just this, in the form of the social commitment of the ROSCA. Missing a deposit in the Health Pot group would have to be acknowledged publicly and would hurt other group members (by reducing the size of the pot), and so once people join the Health Pot, social pressure might discourage them from reneging on their savings plans. In addition, the Health Pot o¤ered the added advantage that people would receive the product earlier than they would if they saved alone (for all individuals other than the last in the cycle). If people used the Health Pot, it must therefore be due to a combination of these two factors.
Finally, turning to coping with health shocks, both the Safe Box and the Health Savings Account (HSA) could be used to save in anticipation of emergencies. The di¤erence between the two treatments is that the HSA o¤ered an earmarking function that the Safe Box did not, since money deposited in the HSA could only be withdrawn for health emergencies. Thus, any additional impact of this treatment over that of the Safe Box should be attributable to this aspect. However, similar to the Lock Box treatment, saving in the HSA limits liquidity: while individuals could withdraw the money quickly (unlike in the Lock Box treatment), they could only do this for health emergencies. Such earmarking might discourage savings for those who would prefer to avoid earmarking savings to a particular purpose.
Our results suggest signi…cant demand for such savings products. We …nd extremely high take-up of all four treatments, suggesting that the primary e¤ect of all the treatments is in their common feature: providing a safe place to protect money from others.
However, the treatments di¤ered in their eventual health impact. In regards to investment in preventative health, we …nd that individuals in the Safe Box and Health Pot groups had signi…cantly higher levels of investments in preventative health products than those in the control group, in the year following the intervention. Individuals in the two other treatment groups (Lock Box and HSA) did not change their preventative health investments on average. While it is not surprising that those in the HSA treatment did not signi…cantly increase investment in preventative health (since the money saved was only to be used for health emergencies), the lack of an e¤ect for the Lock Box suggests that the cost of limited liquidity outweighs the strong commitment the treatment o¤ered.
While people did use the box regularly, they reported saving in very small increments, due to the fear that they would not be able to access the money in case of an emergency.
For this reason, it took them much longer to save up signi…cant sums. While it is likely that they would eventually have saved enough to purchase lumpy health products, we were not able to pick this up in the one year time frame in which we followed people.
In regards to our second outcome, coping with health shocks, we …nd that individuals in both the Safe Box and HSA treatments were less vulnerable to health shocks than individuals in the control group. As was expected given that they were not designed for emergency savings, there were no statistically signi…cant e¤ects in risk coping for the other treatment groups.
We provide further evidence on the savings barriers that these devices helped overcome by examining how impacts varied with background characteristics. Our most robust …nding is that the e¤ects of all four treatments/devices were positive and large for individuals who, at baseline, were giving assistance to others but received no assistance in return. This is consistent with …ndings from a debrie…ng survey administered at endline, in which respondents sampled for a Safe Box reported that they felt less compelled to make transfers when asked for money if their cash was in the box rather than held in cash This is not the only barrier, however. Our …ndings also suggest that time-inconsistent preferences are an important reason for undersaving. Most striking, people with presentbiased preferences did not use or bene…t from the Safe Box but did bene…t from the We also …nd some evidence of intra-household barriers: the e¤ect of the Safe Box on both preventative health investment and risk coping was larger for married individuals.
This result is consistent with experimental evidence from the Philippines presented in Ashraf (2009) , who found that hiding money from one's spouse is desirable under certain intra-household decision-making structures.
All in all, our results suggest that devices which simply help individuals protect their savings from others are bene…cial to about 66% of our sample: the subgroup of the population composed of individuals who are at least as patient in the present as in the future, and are either married or heavily "taxed"by friends and relatives. Adding an earmarking feature (and thus illiquidity) reduces savings for that group on average, but helps those most taxed to better shield their savings from others. For those exhibiting present-bias, composing about 16% of our sample, earmarking is not enough to signi…cantly increase savings. A stronger form of commitment, such as a social commitment, appears necessary to nudge them towards health investments.
Our results are consistent with previous research we conducted in the same area of Kenya, in which we found that simple bank accounts had substantial impacts on savings and investment levels for about 40% of women who run a small vending business, but were useless for the remaining 60% of women vendors, as well as for men in the sample (mostly bicycle taxi drivers) (Dupas and Robinson, 2009 ). Since the bank accounts did not provide any earmarking or strong commitment feature, their primary function was likely to protect income from others. The present study suggests that more sophisticated devices that include stronger commitment features might be better suited for some of those individuals who did not use the simple savings account.
Finally, our results suggest that providing such savings devices could improve welfare -even if individuals in our sample did not necessarily increase their overall saving rate but may have simply reshu-ed their portfolio allocation towards health investments, by revealed preferences this reallocation likely enabled households to achieve an allocation closer to their optimal allocation. 1 2 Experimental Design
Experimental Saving Technologies
This study had two main goals: to better understand the constraints which keep poor households from saving, and to estimate which types of saving devices can increase health investments. To do this, we designed four experimental saving technologies, corresponding to four experimental "treatments". In the …rst experimental treatment (Safe Box ), respondents were given a simple locked box made out of metal. The box had a deposit slit at the top, similar to a piggy bank. The box was locked with a padlock, and the key to the padlock was provided to the participants. Each participant was also given a small passbook, in which they could record the deposits made in the box, so that they could keep track of the total amount in the box without having to open it.
In the second experimental treatment (Lock Box ), respondents were given an identical box as in the Safe Box treatment, but they were not given the key. Instead, the key was kept by the program o¢ cer, so that respondents could not open the box on their own. Participants were given a passbook and asked to record what health product they were saving, and its cost, on the front page. The cell phone number of the program o¢ cer was also written on the passbook, and participants were instructed to call the program o¢ cer once they had reached their saving goal. The program o¢ cer would then meet the participant and open the Lock Box at the shop where the product could be purchased.
In the third experimental treatment, we encouraged participants to use their existing ROSCA structure to create a "Health Pot." Speci…cally, participants were told that, if a subset of the ROSCA members could agree on a health product that they would all want to acquire, they could agree on an additional "health contribution", to be made The fourth experimental treatment (Health Savings Account, or HSA) also took advantage of the ROSCA structure, but this treatment did not require agreement across members. Each participant was encouraged to make regular deposits into an individual HSA managed by the ROSCA treasurer. The treasurer was given a ledger book in which to record deposits, withdrawals and balances for each member's account. The funds deposited into the HSAs were earmarked for health -ROSCA treasurers were encouraged to not allow withdrawals unless the participant requesting the fund needed it for health expenditures (such as clinic fees or medications).
As we will discuss below, as these technologies di¤er in the type and amount of commitment or earmarking they provide, comparing savings under the di¤erent technologies will allow us to estimate which factors are most important and to back out the relative importance of various savings barriers. However, the technologies also di¤er in one other important way: several of them are geared towards mobilizing savings for preventative health products (the Safe Box, the Locked Box, and the Health Pot), while others are geared towards building savings to rely on in case shocks occur (the Safe Box and the HSA). Thus, in our empirical analysis, we separately examine the two types of savings in estimating e¤ects.
Attributes of the Experimental Technologies
As shown in Figure 1 , the four experimental saving technologies o¤ered various combinations of a set of three attributes: protection from others, earmarking, and social commitment. the earmarking and protection from others. Note that this social commitment feature is a combination of group pressure to make deposits and credit (since all but the last member of the group would receive the health product earlier than they would saving alone).
If we call PR1, PR2, and PR3 the e¤ects of, respectively, the Safe Box, the Lock Box, and the Health Pot on preventative health investments, we can estimate the role of physical safety from others as PR1; we can estimate the role of earmarking as (PR2 -PR1); and we can estimate the role of social commitment as (PR3 -PR2).
Likewise, if we call EM1 and EM4 the e¤ects of, respectively, the Safe Box and the HSA on availability of funds for health emergencies, then EM1 will re ‡ect the role of safety from others; and (EM4 -EM1) will re ‡ect the role of earmarking.
It is worth noting right away that our two measures of the impact of earmarking (PR2 -PR1) and (EM4 -EM1) need not be consistent with each other, as the liquidity cost of the earmarking feature o¤ered by the Lock Box was substantially greater than that of the HSA. Indeed, the major risk facing rural households in Western Kenya is the risk of illness, and while the HSA was speci…cally designed to help households build liquid savings in order to access prompt care and treatment in times of sickness, the money saved in the Lock Box was not easily accessible in emergencies. If, as seems likely, saving for emergencies is given higher priority than saving for other health investments, then households might value the HSA earmarking more in our study context.
A discussion is also warranted of what is meant by "physical protection/safety from others." While the box certainly protects against outright theft (since the box would be relatively hard to break into without the key), theft of this nature isn't very common in rural Western Kenya. What is much more common is to be asked for money by others -a neighbor needs money to repair his bike, a relative needs money to repay a debt, etc. -and people report it being very di¢ cult to "say no" to such claims. Though the money in the Safe Box is still immediately accessible in the home, data from qualitative endline surveys presented in Appendix Table A2 reveal that people …nd it easier to say no to these requests when the money is in the box. We conjecture two main channels through which the box could help say no. First, people are often asked for money while they are outside the home. If money could be kept securely at home in the Safe Box, people could avoid carrying too much cash on their person, which would make it easier to refuse requests encountered outside of the home. Second, and probably most importantly, saving in the Safe Box could have generated a "mental accounting" e¤ect: since people were encouraged to choose a savings goal, and to use the Safe Box to attain that goal, people might have truthfully considered the money in the box as "unavailable". In other words, the Safe Box might have given them, through mental accounting, the strength to resist pressure from others.
When Should These Technologies'Attributes Matter?
We expect the three attributes to have di¤erential e¤ects on health savings, depending on the types of barriers that individuals face.
Protection from others (P) should have no e¤ect unless inter-personal barriers are important. These inter-personal barriers could be either inter-household or intra-household.
We will examine the relative importance of these two barriers by comparing the impact of the P feature between married and unmarried individuals -if the impact of the P feature is large even for unmarried respondents, then inter-household con ‡icts must be relevant.
The e¤ect of intra-household con ‡icts can then be estimated by the di¤erence in e¤ects of the P feature between married and unmarried individuals.
Earmarking (E) has an obvious liquidity cost. Thus, if earmarking enables savings for some people, it must be that for them the value of the earmarking outweighs the liquidity cost. There are two types of people for whom that might be the case. First, people for whom the pressure to share is so strong that they need a way to tie up money. Second, earmarking might be valuable for people that are trying to overcome intra-personal barriers (those with time-inconsistent preferences). Among this group, only "sophisticated"individuals would value earmarking to impose self-control, however, since "naïve"
individuals would lack the awareness to see the value of earmarking.
Social commitment (S), given its embedded credit aspect, might appeal to everyone.
Its e¤ect should be largest for those naïve present-biased individuals, however, for whom earmarking alone wouldn't be enough, as discussed above.
3 Sample and Data
Sampling Frame and Randomization
In Spring 2008, we compiled a "census"of all the ROSCAs that could be identi…ed around a given set of market places in one administrative division of Western Kenya. This census included profession-based ROSCAs, such as ROSCAs among bike-taxi drivers or market vendors, in addition to general ROSCAs. For each ROSCA in the census, we administered a baseline survey to identify the size of the ROSCA, the contribution frequency, the services the ROSCA provided, and the list of members. ROSCAs that did not have a regular meeting schedule were declared ineligible for the study. A total of 143 eligible ROSCAs were identi…ed through this census.
These 143 ROSCAs were randomized into 5 groups -one control and 4 treatment groups, each treatment corresponding to one of the 4 experimental treatments described above. The randomization was done after stratifying on a three ROSCA characteristics (gender composition, meeting frequency, and whether the ROSCA provided loans to its members).
Baseline Data
Once a ROSCA had been sampled for the study, a meeting with ROSCA members was organized. During the meeting, participants were given information about preventative health products like bednets, water chlorination products, ceramic water …lters and were encouraged to save towards investing in these products. A random subset of ROSCA members were then sampled (using a random number table) for recruitment in the study.
After obtaining consent, respondents were given a baseline survey that included a module on basic household demographics; a module on time and risk preferences; and a module on health investments.
Not all 143 ROSCAs sampled for the study could be enrolled in the study. By the time we attempted to meet with them to conduct the baseline in Fall 2008, 11 ROSCAs (7.7%) had collapsed, and 19 (13.3%) refused to let enumerators participate in their meeting to enroll participants. This left us with 113 ROSCAs in the …nal sample. Appendix Table   A1 provides characteristics on these 113 ROSCAs. We presented means by treatment groups, as well as the p-values for the tests that the mean in each treatment group equals that in the control group. Despite the fact that we lost 21% of the ROSCAs after the random assignment, the groups appear relatively balanced, suggesting that ROSCA attrition was orthogonal to the experimental treatment assignment (which is not surprising since ROSCAs did not know anything about the treatment at the time they attrited).
O¤er of Experimental Treatments
In each ROSCA that could be enrolled in the study, the assigned experimental treatment (if any) was o¤ered to participants during a regular ROSCA meeting. This means that, even when the experimental treatment was an individual device (the Safe Box, the Lock Box, or the HSA), the o¤er was made in the presence of others and each participant's decision to take-up the o¤er was public (just as the decision to participate in the Health Pot had to be public by nature). Furthermore, even though we enrolled only a random subset of the members of each ROSCA for the study and data collection, all ROSCA members were o¤ered the treatment.
Some respondents belonged to two or more ROSCAs enrolled in the study. Thus some respondents (9% of the sample) were exposed to more than one experimental treatment.
While the likelihood of being exposed to more than one treatment is not exogenous (it depends on the number of ROSCAs one participates in), the combination of treatment one is exposed to, holding constant the number of ROSCAs, is exogenous. For this reason, we control for the number of enrolled ROSCAs a given participant belongs to in the analysis.
Follow-up Data
Two follow-up surveys, including modules similar to those administered at baseline, were conducted approximately six months and twelve months after the experimental treatments were o¤ered.
In Table A2 , we check for attrition by regressing an indicator for whether the household dropped out of the study on a host of background characteristics and, most importantly, indicators for the various treatment groups. We present results for the pooled sample, as well as men and women separately. The primary data was collected 1 year later, but some outcomes were also collected after 6 months (notably take-up behavior), so we present both measures.
As can be seen, attrition is not di¤erential between the various treatment groups in the overall sample, either at 6 or 12 months. Additionally, attrition is not di¤erential for either men or women for the endline survey. However, attrition was statistically signi…cantly lower for the 6 month interview among men in the treatment groups compared to men in the control group. Fortunately, this does not a¤ect our main outcomes (which were measured after 1 year). Table 1 presents baseline characteristics for the …nal sample available for the analysis.
Final Sample Characteristics
Column 1 presents the sample mean and standard deviation for a series of characteristics.
To test for balance across groups, columns 2-5 present the coe¢ cient estimates (and standard errors) of the di¤erence, for each group, between the baseline mean in the treatment group and the mean in the control group. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the ROSCA-level, since the randomization was done at the ROSCA level. The regressions also include a control for the number of ROSCAs each participant belongs to.
Column 6 presents the p-value for an F-test of the equality of means across all 5 groups.
The background variables are mostly self-explanatory, but the risk preference measures require some explanation. First, we de…ne as "somewhat patient" any respondent who preferred 55 Ksh (or more) in 1 month to 40 Ksh today. For measures of time consistency,
we assign people to one of four categories: (1) "present-biased"individuals who exhibit a higher discount rate in the present than in the future; (2) respondents who exhibit maximum possible discount rates in both the present and future (these individuals preferred 40
Ksh to 500 Ksh in 1 month, and 40 Ksh in 1 month to 500 Ksh in 2 months); (3) respondents who are more patient in the future than in the present; and (4) "time-consistent" individuals who have the same discount rate in the present and the future. to complete primary school). The sample is overall quite poor, with less than a quarter having a cement ‡oor in the house (i.e, they have a dirt ‡oor), and the average weekly income reported by the respondents is below 1,000 Ksh (US $13) on average, which puts them just below the $2 per day threshold. We do not have data on spousal income, but
given the large number of dependents, it is likely that most the average household in our sample is below the $1 per day per person threshold. Health investments are relatively low, with the average respondent owning less than 2 bednets for a household size of 5 or more, and only about half of respondents reporting using chlorine to treat their water.
About 16% of respondents are present-biased. Surprisingly, about 17% appear to be more patient in the present than in the future. Though this seems counter-intuitive, Turning to the di¤erences across groups in columns 2-5, the groups appear well balanced overall, although there are a few minor di¤erences.
4 Results: Take-up Table 2 presents summary statistics on take-up of each of the four experimental products.
Take-up was measured at two points in time, 6 and 12 months after the introduction of the experimental treatments. average. For all these take-up …gures, the median is signi…cantly lower than the mean, however, suggesting some people used the technologies very intensively.
5 Results: Impacts on Health Savings/Investments
Average Impacts
We study the average impact of each of the four experimental treatments by running the following regression:
where Y i is a measure of health savings/investments for individual i, T i is a vector of treatment dummies, X i is a vector of individual characteristics (age, gender, marital status, time preferences, and number of experimental treatments one was exposed to), and R i is a vector of strata dummies. For both outcomes, we estimate equation (1) both with and without the individual controls.
We consider two measures of health savings/investments: (1) how much the individual spent on preventative health products between the endline and baseline; and (2) whether the individual ever had to forgo medical treatment for herself or a family member due to lack of cash. The Lock Box and the Health Pot were designed more speci…cally for the former (preventative investments), the HSA was designed more speci…cally for the latter (building savings to deal with health emergencies), while the Safe Box was designed for both.
Estimates of equation (1) are presented in Table 3 . increased investment by about 128%. By contrast, the HSA treatment had no e¤ect on investment, which is not surprising in that this treatment was to be used for saving for emergencies. Interestingly, the Lock Box also had no e¤ect on investment, even though it was to be used for that purpose. As we will discuss below, this suggests that, on average across the sample, the liquidity cost of holding money in the Lock Box outweighed the bene…t of the earmarking. 
Heterogeneity
We then look for heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ects based on observable characteristics.
To test for these, we run the following set of regressions:
where T RAIT i is a background characteristic along which theory predicts heterogeneity in impacts of some of the experimental treatments. Note that T RAIT i is included in the vector X i . The e¤ect of the treatment for the subgroup of people with a given trait is the sum of the coe¢ cients + . Tables 4 and 5 .
Preventative Investment
We …rst compare providers to non-providers (rows 2 and 3 in Table 4 ). The …rst thing to note here is that the value of keeping money from others is larger for providers than non-providers, though the di¤erence is insigni…cant. What is striking, however, is that while earmarking discourages savings for non-providers, it does not do so for providers.
This suggests that providers are more willing to pay the liquidity cost of earmarking than non-providers (likely to avoid having to give money to others). Similarly, while social commitment is valuable for both types, it is even more valued by providers.
The next set of results compares those exhibiting present-bias with those who do not. As expected, those who are not present-biased bene…t from protecting money from others, do not bene…t from earmarking due to its liquidity cost, but do respond to social commitment, likely due to its credit aspect. By contrast, those exhibiting present-bias do not bene…t from protecting income from others, since they cannot save anything on their own anyway. Interestingly, they also do not bene…t from the individual earmarking feature, which suggests that they are "naïve"about their present-bias. However, they do bene…t to the stronger commitment provided by social commitment feature (much more so than those who are not present-biased).
We then present results broken down by marital status. The main …nding here is that intra-household issues are important -married individuals bene…t more from protecting income than do unmarried individuals. Remember that this speaks mostly to women however, since we have too few unmarried men in our sample to be able to con…rm that these di¤erences by marital status apply to men as well.
The …nal set of results concerns the heterogeneity across gender groups. Here we …nd that, while both women and men negatively value earmarking on average, and both bene…t from the the social commitment feature, only women bene…t from pure physical protection from others. Can this di¤erence be explained by heterogeneity in time preferences between the two groups? While the proportion of people exhibiting present-bias with respect to cash is the same across gender groups, it could be that men are more likely than women to be time-inconsistent when it comes to health speci…cally. We cannot test whether that is the case in our data, since our baseline survey only measured time preferences with respect to cash, and not to health. Social commitment spurs savings for those who are present-biased more than for those who aren't, which is consistent with our prior results. One notable di¤erence is that, as expected, earmarking is much more valuable here than it was for preventative investment, which suggests that people, in our study context, value earmarking for emergency saving (a …rst order concern to many households) more than for preventative health.
Saving for Emergencies

Conclusion
In contrast to borrowing, which requires a market (or at least, interaction between two agents), saving can be done by oneself -in theory. In practice, however, saving by oneself appears to be very di¢ cult for most people, in both developed and developing countries. But where households in developed countries have access to many products to help them surmount their saving di¢ culties (certi…cates of deposits, automatic transfers to 401(k)s, etc.), households in developing countries have to rely on informal arrangements (Rutherford, 2000; Collins et al., 2009 ). While some of these arrangements o¤er much needed commitment features (such as ROSCAs), the array of options appear ine¢ ciently low: our results suggest that households in rural Kenya would save more if they had access to a broader array of saving devices, from simple Safe Box es to commitment contracts.
A key outstanding question is whether the market (or governments) can provide such contracts e¢ ciently (see Bryan et al., 2010 , for a review of the challenges in developing e¢ cient commitment contracts). To protect my money from other household members
To have time to talk to my friends in the group/socialize Notes: Exchange rate was roughly 75 Ksh to US $1 during the study period. 1 "Provider" is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual declared having given money to a relative or friend in the three months preceding the baseline survey, but not having asked money from a relative or friend over the same time period. 2 "Somewhat Patient" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent prefers 75 Ksh (or less) in 1 month to 40 Ksh now. "Present-Biased" is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent exhibits a higher discount rate between today and 1 month from today than between 1 month from today and 2 months from today. 3 The risky asset paid off 4 times the amount invested with probability 0.5, and 0 with probability 0.5.
Sample Mean
Std. Dev.
Coefficient (std. errors) on Treatment Dummies: Notes: OLS regressions with individual and ROSCA-level controls. Individual controls inlude age, gender, and the four "TRAITS" (married, provider, present-biased, optimistic) . Rosca level controls include the monthly ROSCA contribution as well as the stratification dummies. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the rosca-level. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10%. 1 "Provider" is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual declared having given money to a relative or friend in the three months preceding the baseline survey, but not having asked money from a relative or friend over the same time period. 2 There are extremely few unmarried men in each treatment group (88% of men are married), therefore the coefficient estimate on "married" is in practice estimated off of married women only.
Appendix Table A5 . Heterogeneity of Impacts (Remedial Health Investments) ( Notes: OLS regressions with individual and ROSCA-level controls. Individual controls inlude age, gender, and the four "TRAITS" (married, provider, present-biased, optimistic) . Rosca level controls include the monthly ROSCA contribution as well as the stratification dummies. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the rosca-level. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10%. 1 "Provider" is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual declared having given money to a relative or friend in the three months preceding the baseline survey, but not having asked money from a relative or friend over the same time period. 2 There are extremely few unmarried men in each treatment group (88% of men are married), therefore the coefficient estimate on "married" is in practice estimated off of married women only.
